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In this study, we investigate the trading patterns of corporate insiders around the announcement 
dates of shareholder class action lawsuits and related settlements. In particular, we explore 
whether these trading patterns are indicative of information asymmetries between managing and 
non-managing insiders. We provide evidence that litigation and settlement announcements have 
a significant impact on the stock prices of sued firms, and that foreknowledge of these events 
may be used by insiders to earn abnormal profits. We assess both actual and proposed trades by 
insiders in sued firms to detect abnormal trading activity prior to these events. Our results 
provide strong evidence of abnormal trading activity by insiders of sued firms prior to these 
announcements. The direction of their trades suggests the presence of informed trading prior to 
both litigation and settlement announcements. Moreover, we observe that managers exhibit 












The thesis was a long and eventful journey for me and it taught me much more than just quality 
research. However, it would not be completed without the support of some of very important 
people in my life. First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor, Thomas Walker, who 
guided me at every step of this journey. His valuable insight into my topic and constructive 
criticism enabled me to perform better research and served as a benchmark for my thesis. I feel 
extremely grateful that I was able to spend time and gain insights into the topic from an 
experienced and a knowledgeable person. Thank you Professor Walker for everything. 
At the same time, I would also like to thank my dear friends Mireille, Sarine, Catherine and 
Harshjot who stood by me in my good and bad times. They were my pillars of strength 
throughout my journey and were always open to discussions or correcting me when I was 
confused. Thanks to my friends for always being there for me. 














CONTRIBUTION OF AUTHORS 
 
The initial insider trading dataset used in this study was provided by Pukthuanthong Kuntara. 
The dataset contained insider transactions filled on Forms 3, 4, and 5, and proposed transactions 








1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 1 
2. Literature Review ................................................................................................................................... 2 
2.1 Information Content of Insider Trades .......................................................................................... 2 
2.2. Insider Trading around Corporate Events .................................................................................... 4 
2.3 Insider Trading around Fraudulent Events ................................................................................... 6 
3. Data and Sample Description................................................................................................................. 8 
3.1 Data .................................................................................................................................................... 8 
3.2 Summary Statistics ......................................................................................................................... 10 
4. Methodology .......................................................................................................................................... 12 
4.1 Event Study Methodology .............................................................................................................. 13 
4.2 Patterns in Insider Trading Behaviour ......................................................................................... 14 
4.2.1 Measures of Insider Trading ................................................................................................... 15 
4.2.2 Categorizing Insider Trades by Insider Role ........................................................................ 15 
4.2.3 Control Sample Selection ........................................................................................................ 15 
4.2.4 Abnormal Insider Trading Activities ..................................................................................... 16 
5. Results .................................................................................................................................................... 16 
5.1 Abnormal Stock Performance around Lawsuit Announcements ............................................... 16 
5.2 Abnormal Stock Performance around Settlement Announcements .......................................... 18 
5.3 Insider Trading Around Litigation Announcements ................................................................... 19 
5.3.1 Actual Trades By All Insiders ................................................................................................. 19 
5.3.2 Managing versus Non-Managing Insiders ............................................................................. 20 
5.3.3 Drivers of Abnormal Trades ................................................................................................... 21 
5.3.4 Control Sample ......................................................................................................................... 22 
5.3.5 Proposed Sales .......................................................................................................................... 22 
5.4 Insider Trading Around Settlement Announcements ................................................................. 24 
6. Conclusions ............................................................................................................................................ 26 
References .................................................................................................................................................. 27 
Appendices ................................................................................................................................................. 52 
Appendix 1: Excluded Insiders ............................................................................................................ 52 




1. Introduction  
In this study, we examine how the trading behaviour of corporate insiders changes prior to the 
announcement of securities class action lawsuits and settlements. We choose securities class 
action lawsuits and settlements as events of interest because we hypothesize that they are not 
entirely unexpected for corporate insiders. Moreover, we investigate differences between the 
trading activities of managing and non-managing insiders. We hypothesize that managers are 
more likely to have an informational advantage over non-managing insiders, hence they will 
exhibit higher abnormal trading activity prior to litigation and settlement announcements. 
Our initial analysis focuses on the wealth effects of securities class action announcements and 
related settlements. On one hand this helps us establish that litigation announcements indeed 
have a significant wealth effect once they are announced. On the other hand, it allows us to 
explore price trends prior to litigation announcement which may be attributed to informed traders 
taking advantage of their information. 
We then focus on examining trends in actual and proposed insider trades around litigation and 
settlement announcements. We do this by estimating the differences in insider trading activities 
during event windows surrounding the announcements and expected trading during a prior 
estimation period. In Addition we examine how insider trading differs between our sample and a 
matched control sample. Finally, we explore differences in the trading activities of managing and 
non-managing insiders. 
There is an extensive body of literature that examines the information content of insider trades as 
well as insider trading prior to corporate events. Also, several studies have investigated insider 
trading around lawsuits. However, all these studies only examine actual trades by insiders. We 
are not aware of any literature on insider trading around settlement announcements. We 
contribute to the literature on insider trading by including proposed sales in our analysis. 
Moreover, we are the first to investigate insider trading patterns around public settlement 
announcements. 
We hypothesize that insider of sued firms trade on their foreknowledge of forthcoming 
lawsuits/settlements for personal gains. We also expect information asymmetries between 
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managing and non-managing insiders in regard to forthcoming lawsuits/settlements. Hence we 
expect an increase (decrease) in net-sales and proposed sales by insiders of sued firms prior to 
lawsuit (settlement) announcements. In addition we expect the magnitude of abnormal trading by 
managing insiders to be greater than that of non-managing insiders.     
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the existing literature exploring the 
information content of insider trades and insider trading patterns prior to corporate events. 
Section 3 describes our data and summary statistics. Section 4 describes our methodology. 
Section 5 illustrates the empirical results of our study. Section 6 provides a brief conclusion. 
2. Literature Review  
2.1 Information Content of Insider Trades 
There is a vast body of literature that examines the incentives and information content of insider 
trades. Although some insider trades are due to insiders’ liquidity and portfolio rebalancing 
objectives, another component of insider trades may be driven by the information advantage of 
insiders over other market participants. Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968) suggest that in general, 
insiders tend to abnormally sell (buy) before large stock price declines (rises). However, they do 
not make any adjustments for risk. Jaffe (1974) assesses the profitability of insider trades by 
evaluating a sample of the 200 largest securities on CRSP. He observes insider transitions in 
these companies in five random months, over the period from 1962 to 1968. He also divides his 
sample into sub-samples of large transactions with a value greater than 20,000 dollars, and a sub-
sample of intensive trading months, i.e. months in which the number of purchasers (sellers) 
surpasses the number of sellers (purchasers) by a constant. He then evaluates the abnormal 
returns associated with each sub-sample during three different holding periods to assess the 
cumulative abnormal returns in the short and long-term. In his analysis, he assumes a transaction 
cost of two percent. He finds that although all sub-samples produce abnormal profits, only the 
subsample that includes intensive trading months produces a positive profit of about three 
percent after including transaction costs. Moreover, he performs a similar analysis on samples of 
intensive trading months in different time periods in the1950s and 1960s and arrives at similar 
results, suggesting that insiders have an information advantage. Finnerty (1976) evaluates the 
presence of informed insider trading for all NYSE firms during a 3 year period starting in 
January 1969 and ending in December 1971. He uses a similar methodology to Jaffe (1974), 
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although he separates buy and sell transactions into monthly buy and sell portfolios. He then 
assesses the one year holding period return associated with his monthly insider trade sample. His 
results are similar to Jaffe (1974), suggesting that stock prices tend to appreciate for firms in 
which insiders purchase shares during a given month and decline when they sell. Rozeff and 
Zaman (1988) extend a study by Finnerty (1976a), who finds that insiders tend to purchase 
securities of smaller companies with larger earnings and larger dividends, compared to securities 
they sell. They test whether the profitability of insider trades can be explained by size and 
growth effects. They estimate abnormal returns associated with a portfolio of insider trades 
during a ten year period from 1973 to 1982 using a standard market model event study. They 
take size and earnings to price effects into account when estimating abnormal returns. Their 
results suggest that insiders achieve significant abnormal returns even after adjusting for 
transaction costs. Adjusting the abnormal returns for size and earnings to price effects wipes out 
25 to 50 % of excess profits. Yet, even then, their results suggest that insiders still earn excess 
profits of 3 to 3.5 percent per year. Other early studies by Seyhun (1988), Lin and Howe (1990), 
Seyhun (1992), and Meulbroek (1992) find similar results that suggest that insiders trade on 
special information that is not reflected in securities prices. Wisniewski and Bohl (2005) also 
find similar if not stronger results using Polish insider trading data. They argue that the abnormal 
profits associated with insider trades on the Warsaw Stock Exchange are higher compared to 
those in mature and developed markets because of poor enforcement of insider trading 
regulations. Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) suggest that the superior information by insiders can 
be explained by temporary misevaluations of their company’s stock price by market participants, 
although their insights into the future prospects of the company also contribute to the 
informativenss of their trades. Ravina and Sapienza (2010) evaluate information asymmetries 
that exist between insiders and other market participants, as well as information asymmetries 
between corporate executives, independent directors1, and outside block-holders2 of a company’s 
shares. They assess insider trading data between 1986 and 2003. They find that all three groups 
outperform the market in most holding periods following their purchases. Executives earn the 
highest returns following their purchases, followed by independent directors with about two 
percent lower profits, and block-holders. Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski (2012) claim that some 
                                                          
1 A member of a company's board of directors who was brought in from outside the company 
2 Owner of 10 percent or more of the company’s shares 
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insider trades might be of a routine nature without any information content, while other insider 
trades may be based on superior information about the future performance of the firm. They 
define routine trades as trades performed by the same insider in the same calendar month during 
at least 3 years of their sample period, which starts in 1989 and ends in 2007. Using this 
approach, they classify about half of all insider trades in their sample as being of a routine 
nature. Their results suggest that a long/short portfolio of routine insider purchases/sales earns 
almost zero annualized abnormal returns, while the remaining insider trades, i.e. trades that 
likely have an annualized value-weighted and equally weighted abnormal returns of 9.8 and 21.6 
percent, respectively. 
2.2. Insider Trading around Corporate Events 
There is a sizeable stream body of research on insider trading behaviour around corporate events. 
These events typically cause significant stock price changes apart from the effects of insider 
sales and purchases. While most empirical evidence suggests that insiders trade on their 
information advantage, the results are not always consistent. Earlier studies that examine insider 
trading around corporate events such as takeover bids (Seyhun, 1990), dividend initiations (John 
and Lang, 1991), seasoned equity offerings (Karpoff and Lee, 1991), stock repurchases (Lee, 
Mikkelson, and Partch, 1992) and information-sensitive security issues (Lee and Loughran, 
1998; Kahle, 2000) show that abnormal insider trades increase prior to these events. Some 
studies such as Rozeff and Zaman (1998), Lakonishok and Lee (2001), and Jenter (2005) suggest 
that insiders are contrarian investors. Huddart, Ke and Shi (2007) suggest that insiders avoid 
trading on their inside knowledge before high jeopardy events such as earnings announcements 
and trade most heavily after earnings announcements on their foreknowledge of price-relevant 
information in the forthcoming 10-K or 10-Q filing. Louis, Sun, and White (2010) evaluate 
insider trading behaviour after repurchase tender offers. They point out that insiders are better 
positioned to exploit their inside information and earn abnormal profits following Dutch auction 
repurchases compared to fixed price repurchases, since the price of Dutch auctions is determined 
by investors. They evaluate insider trading within +/- one year of repurchase tender offers during 
the period 1984 to 2003. Their results suggest that insiders exhibit abnormal net-selling in the 
quarter following the repurchase tender offer and that their net selling is negatively related to the 
future performance of the firm. They also divide their sample into Dutch auctions and fixed price 
tender offers and find that the abnormal net-selling and the negative relationship between net-
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selling and performance are only significant for Dutch auction tender offers, suggesting that 
insider trades after Dutch auction repurchases are of an informative nature while insider trades 
after fixed price tender offers are driven by liquidity purposes. Kedia and Zhou (2009) indirectly 
investigate insider trading in corporate bonds of firms that have been targeted for a takeover. 
They state that bondholders of targeted companies only gain if the firms’ bonds are riskier than 
the acquirer’s debt. Hence, in order to earn abnormal profits by trading target bonds prior to 
public takeovers, one must have comprehensive knowledge of the risk aspects of both the 
acquirer and the target. They attempt to detect the presence of informed trading by regressing 
abnormal bond price returns for a sample of 642 target companies during the period 1994 to 
2006 on credit rating differences of the acquirer and the target, controlling for firm specific 
factors such as the maturity of debt and firm size, in the 3 months prior to the public 
announcement of a takeover. They find a significant positive relationship between credit rating 
differences and abnormal returns, suggesting that there is information leakage prior to the 
announcement. Then they exclude companies that were rumored to be targets of a takeover in the 
3 month pre-announcement period, and find that the positive relationship between credit rating 
differences and abnormal returns still holds, suggesting the pre-announcement abnormal returns 
are associated with insider information rather than market anticipation. Moreover, Agrawal and 
Nasser (2012) directly investigate the insider trading patterns prior to takeover announcements 
for sample of takeover announcements between 1988 and 2006. Their findings suggest that, 
although insiders do not engage in active trading prior to takeover announcements, they reduce 
their selling significantly, which leads to a roughly 50 percent increase in the monetary value of 
their net-purchases prior to the announcement relative to their normal levels of trading. Hence 
their results suggest that insiders engage in a passive profitable trading strategy related to insider 
information. More recently, Augustin and Brenner (2014) examine insider trading prior to 
merger and acquisition announcements for a sample of 1,859 deals (1,669 unique targets, and 
1,279 unique acquirers) over the period 1996 to 2012. They investigate option trades of insiders 
in their sample. They find significant volumes of abnormal option trading in both target and 
acquirer firms prior to merger announcements. Jain and Sunderman (2014) analyze insider 
trading activity around merger announcements in the Indian stock market3 over a 15 year period 
1996 to 2010. They find that insiders engage in private information-based trading prior to 
                                                          
3 Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) 
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industry merger4 announcements, but do not find any abnormal insider trading activity prior to 
non-industry merger announcements. Agrawal and Cooper (2014) investigate insider trading 
patterns of insiders prior to earnings restatements5 of 518 US firms during the period 1997 to 
2002. They hypothesize that insiders will exhibit abnormal trading activity if the earnings 
restatement is of a serious nature. They compare their sample’s insider trading behaviour with a 
control sample and find no evidence of significant abnormal trading prior to the announcement 
of an earnings restatement. Then they divide their full sample into sub-samples based on 
restatements being positive/negative (upward/downward adjustments), the number of restated 
quarters, and potential losses6. Their results indicate that insiders of restating firms exhibit larger 
and more significant abnormal selling and net-selling prior to restatements that are more severe 
in nature. This finding is in line with their hypothesis of informed insider trading prior to 
restatement announcements. 
2.3 Insider Trading around Fraudulent Events  
There is also an extensive body of literature on insider trading patterns around fraudulent events. 
Summers and Sweeney (1998) examine insider trading activities prior to the illegal, fraudulent 
activities which were mentioned in the Wall Street Journal Index, during the period from 1980 to 
1987. Their findings suggest that prior to these announcements, insiders reduce their 
stockholdings through significant selling activities. Some of the empirical literature on insider 
trading in relation to class action litigation has focused on the merits of the suits (e.g. whether 
managers deliberately delayed the disclosure of material negative information). The release of 
negative information that triggers securities class actions typically causes substantial stock price 
drops at the end of class period. Abnormal insider sales during the class period provide evidence 
on managers’ incentives to delay negative information disclosures and thus the merit of a 
securities class action. Niehaus and Roth (1999) examine insider sales of 63 firms subject to 
securities class actions in the period 1988 to 1994 and find no abnormal insider trading activity 
during the class period7. Griffin and Grundfest (2002) use a larger sample of 842 securities class 
action lawsuits during the period 1996 to 2001 to examine insider trading activities during the 
                                                          
4 Mergers with the same 4-digit SIC codes are considered industry mergers in this paper. 
5 Firms which misstated their earnings (GAAP violations etc.) and are going to adjust their earnings statements. 
6 They use value of loss avoided by selling the stock prior to the announcement of earnings restatement as a proxy 
for potential losses. 




class period. They compare the insider trading activities in their sample with time periods before 
and after the lawsuit and with a control sample of matched non-sued firms. They find that net 
insider sales of sued firms during the class period are significantly higher than those before or 
after the class period and higher than those of matched firms during the same period. In addition, 
they claim that unusual insider sales provide a strong indication of fraud in a securities class 
action litigation. Iqbal, Shetty, and Wang (2007) examine insider trading in 340 sued firms 
around securities class actions. They find no significant insider sales during the class period. 
However, they show that insiders increase their shareholdings immediately before the class 
period, suggesting that insiders profit from artificially inflated stock prices during the class 
period. Thevenot (2012) investigates insider trading behaviour around GAAP violations that are 
likely to be intentional and in which managers are likely to trade on private knowledge 
associated with the violation. They claim that managers are more likely to have knowledge of 
violations related to revenue recognition8 and other accounting irregularities9 as identified by 
Hennes et al. (2008). They categorize their sample of financial restatements during 1997 to 2006 
into fraudulent10 and non-fraudulent restatements. Their analysis indicates that insiders of firms 
in which the restatement is less severe are more likely to trade on private information. Their 
findings suggest that although insiders of fraudulent firms exhibit increased selling activity prior 
to restatement announcement, their increased selling activity is driven by their risk aversion and 
personal preferences rather than private information. Badertscher, Hribar, and Jenkins (2011) 
examine insider trading around accounting restatements as well as the market reaction to the 
associated announcements. They observe a larger negative market reaction to restatement 
announcements in firms in which insiders tend to be net-sellers than firms in which insiders are 
net-purchasers. In addition, they find a significant negative market reaction following disclosed 
insider trades but no significant market reaction following non-disclosed insider trades. Their 
findings suggest that investors tend to see insider trades as an information signal and price the 
restatement announcement accordingly. In addition, they argue that the negative market reaction 
prior to restatement announcements is caused by investors’ reaction to insider trades rather than 
informed trading or information leakage. Bradley, Cline, and Lian (2014) investigate the 
presence of informed trading during the class period associated with 1,596 lawsuits during the 
                                                          
8 See Feroz et al. (1991), Anderson and Yohn (2002), and Palmrose and Scholz (2004).  
9 Restatements related to costs or expenses, restructuring, assets, or inventory. 
10 If the firm admits or is accused of fraud by an outside party, such as the SEC, investors, or the media. 
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period 1996 to 2011. They evaluate call option exercises by executives which are likely to be 
information driven11. Their results suggest that executives of sued firms significantly increase 
their informed option exercises during the class period compared to the pre-class periods and 
relative to a matched control sample. This finding suggests the presence of informed trading by 
executives of sued firms prior to securities class action lawsuits. Griffin, Lont, and McClune 
(2014) assess insider trading around the disclosure12 of debt covenant violations for first time 
offender firms during the period 2000 to 2008. They relate the trading activity of insiders to 
abnormal returns around the disclosure date. Their findings show that insiders are net sellers 
prior to the disclosure, and that the net-selling activity increases prior to the stock price decline 
of violating firms, suggesting that insider trades may be based on an information advantage.  
 
 
3. Data and Sample Description 
3.1 Data 
Our data set includes information on proposed and actual insider transactions, securities class 
action lawsuits, securities class action settlements, and financial market data. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) defines an insider as an executive, officer, 
director, controlling person of the firm, or any principal shareholder who owns more than 10% of 
total common stock outstanding. Besides requiring insiders to report their holdings to the SEC on 
an annual basis, U.S. securities laws mandate the reporting of any changes to those holdings plus 
the announcement of restricted share sales in advance. Actual insider sales and purchases are 
reported on Form4. Proposed insider sales are reported on Form144 which must be filed 
whenever insiders plan to sell restricted (or unregistered) shares. Specifically, Form 144 must be 
filed as a notice of the proposed sale of restricted securities or securities held by an affiliate of 
the issuer when the amount to be sold during any three month period exceeds 500 shares or units 
or has an aggregate sales price in excess of 10,000$. 
                                                          
11 Option exercises that are not associated with a vesting, maturity, or ex-dividend date (Brooks et al. 2012). 
12 SEC regulations and generally accepted accounting principles require disclosure of all material breaches of debt 




We construct an insider trading dataset from the Insider Filing Data Feed (IFDF) provided by 
Thomson Reuters, which captures all U.S. insider holdings and trading activity as reported on 
SEC Forms 3, 4, and 5. From IFDF, we obtain insider transaction data from January 1996 to 
December 2013. Following the literature investigating the presence of informed insider trading13, 
we omit all duplicate, amended, and inconsistent transactions from our data set. In addition, we 
exclude option exercises since they are likely to be related to employee compensation packages 
that should be less affected by insider information. Ravina and Sapienza (2010) illustrate that 
trades by principal shareholders who are not officers or directors do not convey much 
information. Consequently, we focus our attention on trades by company executives, officers, 
directors, and controlling persons. For each firm covered in our insider data set, we retrieve daily 
return data and Standard Industrial Classification codes (SIC) from the Center for Research in 
Securities Prices (CRSP). In addition, we collect information on the monthly market 
capitalization for each firm from COMPUSTAT. 
We match our insider data set with a litigation data set that we collected from Stanford’s 
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (SCAC)14, which tracks federal securities class action 
lawsuits since 1996. Our litigation data set covers the period from January 1996 to December 
2013. We identify 3,127 lawsuits that were filed against publicly traded firms.  
We exclude lawsuits in which firms are sued more than once in one year to reduce any 
estimation biases that may result from overlapping litigations. In addition, we exclude IPO 
related cases and lawsuits in which sued firms do not have price records on the CRSP daily 
database at least two years before the lawsuit announcement. This reduces the size of our 
litigation sample to 2,195 securities class action lawsuits which we use in our event study to 
investigate the wealth effects of securities class action lawsuit/settlement announcements. 
Finally, when analyzing the insider trading behavior prior to lawsuit/settlement announcements 
we drop another 42 firms, because we fail to find a matching firm meeting our criteria15 for the 
control sample, which we use later in our study to compare the trading behavior of insiders in 
                                                          
13 Seyhun (1988), Shetty and Wang (2007), Bradley, Cline, and Lian (2014) 
14 http://securities.stanford.edu/filings.html 
15 We choose the firm with the closest market capitalization to the litigated firm in the litigation sample. These 
firms are chosen from all the firms in CRSP with the same 3-digit truncated SIC code as the litigated firms. 




sued firms with the trading of insiders in similar non-sued firms. We report summary for the 
2,153 firms used in our insider trading analysis. 
We also use Stanford’s Securities Class Action Clearinghouse as well as the Securities Class 
Action Alert (SCAA) to retrieve information on securities class action settlements. The SCAA 
tracks all securities class action lawsuits filed since 1988. We retrieve detailed information on 
1,049 securities class action cases that were settled in the period from January 1996 to December 
2013. For each publicly announced settlement, the SCAC and SCAA provide a rich set of 
settlement information including, for example, the date of the settlement, the settlement amount, 
the plaintiff and defendant parties and their legal representation, and a description of the alleged 
violation of the securities laws. We convert settlement amounts to 1996 dollars using CPI 
deflators as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)16. 
We eliminate settlements for which the SCAA provides incomplete settlement details and 
settlements by firms that we could not identify in the Center for Research in Securities Prices 
(CRSP) database. One shortcoming of the SCAA newsletter is that it does not report the exact 
settlement date. To overcome this problem, we accessed Lexis-Nexis and identified 393 firms for 
which we could determine an exact settlement date. Settlements for which the exact 
announcement is unknown or the settled firm does not have price information on CRSP are 
excluded from our sample, which results in a final settlement sample of 315 settlements. 
3.2 Summary Statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the 2,153 securities class action lawsuits and 315 
securities class action settlements in our final sample. We classify the sample into 11 industry 
groups as defined by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)17. Panel A provides 
information on the number of securities class action lawsuits across different industries on a 
yearly basis. It shows that the manufacturing industry has the highest number of filings trailed by 
the Services and Financial industry. In addition, it shows that the manufacturing and services 
industry has the highest number of filings for most years except 2008 when firms in the 
financial, insurance, and real estate sector experienced the most filings. The year 2004 has the 







highest number of filings followed by 2002 and 2003, while the year 1996 has the lowest number 
of filings. 
***Insert Table 1 about here*** 
Panel B provides information on securities class action settlements and average settlement 
amounts categorized by industry sector and year. It shows that the manufacturing and services 
industry have the highest number of settlements followed by the financial, insurance, and real 
estate industry which is not surprising considering that these industries also had the largest 
number of lawsuits. In addition it shows that firms in the financial, insurance, and real estate 
sector have the largest average settlement amounts, trailed by the retail industry and the services 
industry. In terms of yearly average settlement amounts, 2012 has the highest average 
settlements which are roughly 1.5 times as large as settlements in the second highest year, 1999. 
Table 2 presents yearly summary statistics of insider trading activities in sued firms. It describes 
the number of insider sales and purchases, the number of shares sold and purchased, as well as  
the number and volume of proposed sales by insiders in sued firms, in each sample year from 
1996 to 2013. Panel A provides information for all insiders18, Panels B and C report the same 
statistics for managing and non-managing insiders, respectively. There are 2,322,120 actual 
transactions and 130,792 proposed sales. Although managers account for a majority of 
transactions and proposed sales, in terms of volume they only account for about 30 and 10 
percent of actual and proposed transactions, respectively. 
***Insert Table 2 about here*** 
Overall, there are more sell than buy transactions, however sales volume is slightly less than 
purchase volume. The average ratio of sales vs. purchases is about 1.4 for the entire sample 
period while it is considerably higher over the period 2006 to 2008, peaking in 2007 at more than 
2 times the sample average. This peak period for net-selling by insiders is not surprising 
considering that this was the time period surrounding the 2007-08 financial crisis. The 
sales/purchases ratio for managers is higher than the full sample average for all insiders, (roughly 
1.8) while they sell approximately as much as they buy in terms of volume. A noteworthy 
observation is that managers account for 76 percent of sales over the 2006 to 2008 peak period of 
                                                          
18 See Appendix2 for an insider categorization 
 12 
 
selling activity. In addition the frequency of insider trades by all insiders is significantly higher 
during this period compared to other years. This suggests possible informed trading and/or more 
aggressive trading during the years typically associated with the financial crisis. Non-managing 
insiders show approximately equal amounts of selling and buying, both in terms of transaction 
counts and volume. They have slightly fewer sale transactions than purchase transactions 
(sell/buy ratio of 0.9), while their sales volume is slightly higher than their purchase volume 
(sell/buy ratio of 1.1). 
 
4. Methodology 
We investigate the trading behavior of corporate insiders prior to securities class action lawsuit 
and settlement announcements. We proceed as follows: the first part of our study focuses on 
examining the effects of litigation and settlement announcements on a firm’s stock price 
behavior employing standard event study methodology. This fulfills two purposes: first we 
establish that these events have a significant effect on a firm’s stock price and that prior 
knowledge or anticipation of the event is a valuable piece of information, i.e. it allows insiders to 
benefit from their information advantage through informed trades. 
Second, by investigating a firm’s stock price behavior prior to the announcement of a lawsuit 
and/or settlement, we can explore the presence of information leakage and insider trading. Our 
findings indicate that lawsuits and settlements have a significant wealth effect on investors. 
While the markets react negatively to a lawsuit announcement, a settlement announcement is 
viewed as positive news, i.e. it results in a significant positive abnormal return on the 
announcement date. In addition to the negative/positive abnormal returns we observe for 
lawsuits/settlements on the day they are announced, we also observe significant negative/positive 
abnormal returns prior to the announcement. However, the positive returns prior to settlements 
only become statistically significant 1 day prior to the announcement. While this later result 
points to the likely presence of informed trading prior to the announcement, it does not reveal 
whether insiders play an active role in pre-announcement trading. We investigate this issue in the 
second part of our study by analyzing trends in insider trading, taking into account the insiders’ 
position in the firm’s hierarchy, as well as in comparison with a sample of matched control firms 
which were not involved in any securities class action lawsuits during our sample period. 
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4.1 Event Study Methodology 
We use event study methodology to measure the abnormal stock price performance of our 
sample firms prior to and after a lawsuit and/or settlement. Event study methodology measures 
the abnormal return of a stock as the difference between the actual return and the expected return 
around the time of an event. Event studies draw on the efficient market hypothesis of Fama et al. 
(1969) which states that capital markets are efficient in processing information by establishing a 
correct new stock price equilibrium as soon as new information about a firm becomes available. 
The logic underlying the hypothesis is the belief that investors in capital markets process 
publicly available information on firm activities and external events influencing a firm, and that 
they consider not just the impact on current performance but also on the performance of the firm 
in future periods. When additional information becomes available, the firm’s stock price should 
change rapidly and should reflect investors’ revised consensus of the firm’s future profitability. 
The strength of the method lies in the fact that it captures the overall assessment by a large 
number of investors of the discounted value of current and future firm performance attributable 
to individual events which are reflected in the stock price and the market value of the firm. 
Changes in investor’s beliefs regarding the future profitability of a firm are reflected in abnormal 
returns - risk adjusted returns in excess of the firm’s expected return - around an event. 
Abnormal returns thus provide a unique means of associating the impact of a lawsuit or 
settlement announcement on the firm’s expected profitability in future periods (Mc Williams and 
Siegel, 1997).  
There is significant empirical support for the efficient market hypothesis in litigation studies 
including the Loh and Rathinasamy (2003) and Chaghouri and Walker (2004) studies of stock 
price behaviour around litigation announcements. 
We estimate the announcement period returns of sued firms based on the market model. The 
abnormal stock return on day t is calculated by subtracting the return predicted by general market 
trends on the stock from its actual return on that day, as in the following formula: 
𝐴𝑅𝑠𝑡 = 𝑅𝑠𝑡 − 𝛼𝑠 − 𝛽𝑠𝑅𝑚𝑡 
where 𝑅𝑠,𝑡 is the return of stock s at time t: 𝑅𝑠,𝑡 = (𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠,𝑡−1)/𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠,𝑡−1. If the firm 
paid a dividend during our event window, it is included in our return calculations. The subscript t 
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indicates time, the subscript s indicates a specific stock, and the subscript m indicates the market. 
For this study, we use the CRSP value weighted market index to proxy for the market. 
The date of the event, that is, the lawsuit/settlement announcement, is denoted as t=0. We 
estimate the market parameters for each firm over a 500 trading day period from day -750 to day 
-250 (approximately 2 years). We also consider several other methods of calculating a firm’s 
expected return which makes no significance difference in the results. The abnormal returns are 
averaged across N firms on each event day to estimate an average abnormal return over the 
period. 
Under the assumption that the returns on each day are independent and the standard errors are 
cumulative, accumulating the abnormal returns over a given window provides the cumulative 





 From this equation we can calculate the average CAR across all firms. The resulting equation is: 







The null hypothesis to be tested is that the mean excess return during our event window is equal 
to zero. Because t-tests are based on strong assumptions about the underlying return distribution, 
we also perform a Wilcoxon test (a non-parametric test) to ensure the robustness of our results. 
In a Wilcoxon test, both the sign and the magnitude of abnormal performance are taken into 
consideration when calculating the test statistic. 
4.2 Patterns in Insider Trading Behaviour 
We examine trends in both actual insider sales and purchases as well as proposed insider sales. 
To investigate insider trading patterns in sued firms around securities class action and settlement 
announcements, we examine time series patterns in quarterly insider sales, purchases, and net 
sales for actual insider trades during the period from 8 quarters before to 8 quarters after a 
lawsuit/settlement announcement. Moreover, we conduct the same analysis on a group of 
matched control firms to ensure the robustness of our findings. 
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4.2.1 Measures of Insider Trading 
We measure insider trading activities by considering the number of transactions (a trade-based 
measure) and the number of shares traded (a volume-based measure). On a trade basis, net sales 
are the number of sale transactions minus the number of purchase transactions by insiders in 
each interval. To take into account the effect of firm size on our volume based measures, we 
standardize all volume-based measures by dividing the number of shares traded, or proposed, by 
the average shares outstanding of each firm during the year prior to the announcement. All 
references to the volume-based measures later in this paper are to standardized measures. On a 
volume basis, net sales are the number of shares sold minus the number of shares purchased by 
insiders in each interval. Because the trades by beneficial owners as well as several other 
categories19 are less likely to be information driven. Therefore, we report the results excluding 
those categories, although including them does not differentiate the results qualitatively. 
4.2.2 Categorizing Insider Trades by Insider Roles 
Using the IFDF’s definition of insider roles we form two insider groups, i.e. managing and non-
managing insiders. Managing insiders are defined as all corporate officers who are in charge of 
principal business units, divisions or functions, and any other person who performs a policy 
making function (Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon, 2000). Non-managing insiders include the 
members of the board of directors (other than the chairman), committee members, and all other 
insiders excluding corporate officers. The categorization of insiders20 into two mutually 
exclusive sub-groups of managing and non-managing insiders allows us to perform pairwise 
comparisons between these groups. We compare the trading activity by these two groups of 
insiders to explore whether there are any apparent differences in the information content of the 
trades by each group and each group’s trading pattern over time. 
4.2.3 Control Sample Selection 
We match our litigation/settlement sample with a sample of comparable publicly traded firms, 
excluding firms that were involved in a securities class action lawsuit during our sample period 
(1996-2013). To be considered as a matching firm, we require each control firm to have the same 
3-digit SIC code as the sample firm, and an average market capitalization (over the year prior to 
the litigation/settlement announcement) in the range of 0.1 to 10 times the market capitalization 
                                                          
19 See Appendix 1 for excluded insiders 
20 See Appendix 2 for a detailed description of our insider categorization 
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of the sample firm. In order to arrive at one match per sample firm, we pick the control firm with 
the market capitalization closest to the corresponding sample firm. 
4.2.4 Abnormal Insider Trading Activities 
We expect insiders in sued firms to trade in anticipation of stock price movements around 
lawsuit/settlement announcements. We focus on measures of abnormal insider trading, defined 
as actual insider trading minus expected insider trading, on a firm level basis. Expected insider 
trading activities are measured as the average insider trading activities in each sued firm, during 
a 12 quarter period beginning 20 quarters and ending 8 quarters prior to the announcement of a 
lawsuit/settlement. We calculate quarterly abnormal trades for each firm using the following 
formula: 
𝐴𝑇𝑠𝑞 = 𝑇𝑠𝑞 − 𝐸𝑇𝑠 
where 𝐸𝑇𝑠 represents the expected insider trading for firm s based on the above-mentioned  12 
quarter estimation period and 𝑇𝑠𝑞 is the actual insider trading for firm s during quarter q. 
Furthermore, we calculate the average abnormal trading across all firms during each quarter 
based on the following formula: 







The null hypothesis to be tested is that the mean abnormal trades during each event quarter are 
equal to zero. As in our prior analyses we report both student t-test (parametric) and Wilcoxon 
signed rank (non-parametric) test statistics. 
5. Results  
5.1 Abnormal Stock Performance around Lawsuit Announcements 
Our lawsuit sample consists of 2,153 securities class action lawsuits filed between January 1996 
and December 2013. To evaluate the short and long-term effects of a lawsuit announcement on a 
defendant firm’s performance, we investigate the abnormal performance of sued firms within 
various timeframes around their lawsuit announcement. Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration 
of the defendant firm’s average abnormal return (AAR) during a period of 250 trading days 
(about 360 calendar days) before and after a lawsuit announcement. 
We observe an AAR of -1.44 percent on day 0, the day the lawsuit is announced. Interestingly, 
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we also observe average abnormal returns in excess of -1 percent during each of the 6 days prior 
to the lawsuit, averaging  -1.93 percent on day -1, one day prior to the lawsuit announcement. 
This points to the presence of informed trading or information leakage about a forthcoming 
lawsuit filing before the announcement date. Although the specific reasons for the pre-
announcement decline may vary from case to case, our results suggest that lawsuits do not hit the 
market by surprise. While they still cause a significant price decline on the announcement day, 
they are preceded by several days of declines. 
***Insert Figure 1 about here*** 
Table 3 reports average CARs in the 250 trading days before and after the lawsuit announcement 
for different event windows. Panel A provides average CARs for event windows ending prior to 
the lawsuit announcement. Panel B reports the same information for event windows around and 
after the lawsuit announcement. We observe a price decline both before and after the lawsuit 
announcement. It should be noted that the CARs for all windows are significant at the 0.1% 
level. 
***Insert Table 3 about here*** 
Figure 2 illustrates the pre-announcement decline even better by graphing cumulative abnormal 
returns 250 days before and after the announcement of a lawsuit. While we still observe that sued 
firms experience a sharp price decline on the day of the announcement, we can also see that at 
the time a lawsuit is filed against a firm, its stock price has already dropped by approximately 
51.82 percent during the preceding 250 days. Again, there are several factors that likely drive 
this price decline. Our later analysis focuses on insider trading behavior prior to these lawsuits. 
On one hand, increased sales by insiders may put some selling pressure on the stock price and 
may send a negative signal to other investors who may follow suit and reduce their holdings as 
well. On the other hand, the stock price decline may be caused by a leakage of information about 
an imminent lawsuit or a possible overlap of the pre-announcement period with the class action 
period (during which the crimes allegedly took place). Because it is impossible to determine in 
hindsight what may have caused the pre-lawsuit price decline in each case, we make no attempt 
at investigating this issue. What is important for our subsequent analysis is the observation that 
early knowledge of or the ability to predict a lawsuit is highly valuable. Given their role within a 
 18 
 
firm, insiders - specifically those in leading managerial positions - should be able to exploit their 
information advantage. 
***Insert Figure 2 about here*** 
5.2 Abnormal Stock Performance around Settlement Announcements 
Our settlement sample consists of 315 lawsuits that were part of our litigation sample, that were 
settled during our sample period, and for which we were able to identify the exact settlement 
date and settlement details. In Figure 3, we graph the average abnormal returns (AAR) of all 
settled firms 250 days before and after the settlement announcement. 
***Insert Figure 3 about here*** 
We observe that settling firms experience a positive average abnormal return of 2.24 percent 
(significant at the 0.1 percent level) on the day the settlement is announced. This supports our 
hypothesis that a settlement announcement is perceived as good news by investors. Moreover, 
the graph suggests that abnormal returns on the days prior to and after the settlement 
announcement follow a random pattern and are close to zero, which suggests that settlement 
announcements may be less predictable by market participants compared to lawsuit 
announcements.  
Table 4 provides reports average CARs in the 250 trading days before and after a settlement 
announcement. Panel A provides average CARs for windows ending prior to the settlement 
announcement. Panel B reports the same information for event windows around and after the 
settlement announcement. Except for event windows that cover the week that starts one day prior 
to the settlement announcement, all other event windows exhibit CARs that are statistically or 
economically insignificant. The only exception is the window covering the period from 60 to 1 
days prior to the announcement with a CAR of 4.72 percent which is statistically significant. 
***Insert Table 4 about here*** 
In Figure 4, we graph CARs during a period of 250 days before and after a settlement 
announcement. We observe that settling firms experience a downward trend in their stock prices 
between 250 and 150 days prior to their settlement announcement. This is likely caused by 
investor uncertainty during the ongoing litigation. Around 74 days prior to the settlement 
announcement an upward trend starts, eliminating any losses that were incurred during the prior 
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27 days before the settlement. On the day of the announcement we observe the same upward 
spike in stock prices that we had observed in Figure 3. The upward trend continues to persist 
even after the announcement of the settlement. However, the positive CARs turn statistically 
insignificant about a week after the case has been settled. 
***Insert Figure 4 about here*** 
5.3 Insider Trading Around Litigation Announcements 
Table 5 reports average abnormal net-sales, both on a trade and volume basis, for eight quarters 
before and after a lawsuit announcement. Panel A provides average abnormal trades for all 
insiders. Panels B and C report average abnormal net-sales for managing and non-managing 
insiders, respectively. The abnormal trade measures in this table are calculated as the differences 
between the actual and expected trades for each insider group21. This allows us to capture the 
abnormal trading by subgroups of insiders in an unbiased manner, since managers tend to show 
higher net selling behaviour during the estimation period than their non-managing counterparts.  
***Insert Table 5 about here*** 
5.3.1 Actual Trades by All Insiders 
Panel A of Table 5 shows that on an aggregate basis, insiders display abnormal net selling 
behaviour prior to lawsuit announcements. Trade-based abnormal net-selling is significant until 
the last quarter before the lawsuit. During quarter -1 (90 days to 1 day prior to the 
announcement), mean net selling activity remains significant in terms of magnitude, but loses its 
statistical significance in our median test. Abnormal net selling activity reaches its peak during 
the period from one year to 90 days before the announcement, dropping to almost half of its peak 
value during the 90 days before the announcement. After the announcement, abnormal net 
selling approaches zero and becomes statistically insignificant in all parametric tests. Similar to 
our trade-based measure, our volume-based measure is at its peak during the year prior to the 
announcement, however it is not statistically significant. This suggests that insiders reduce their 
holdings through more frequent net-selling prior to the litigation announcement. However, they 
do not sell abnormal volumes, possibly to avoid the detection by regulatory agencies or 
                                                          
21 We calculate the expected trades for all insiders during a 12 quarter period starting 20 quarters before the 
announcement. Expected trades for managing (non-managing) insiders are calculated by only considering trades 




investors, and the associated legal repercussions22. Our evidence of abnormal selling prior to 
litigation announcements is in line with Bradley, Cline, and Lian (2014) who suggest the 
presence of informed option exercises prior to securities class action lawsuits. However, it 
contrasts with Shetty and Wang’s (2007) study, who fail to detect abnormal trading activity prior 
to securities class action lawsuits, although they detect possible informed purchasing activity 
prior to the class period. It must be noted that their litigation sample of 340 cases is much smaller 
than either Bradley et al’s (2014) sample of 1,596 lawsuits or our sample of 2,153 cases. 
5.3.2 Managing versus Non-Managing Insiders 
When we focus on the trading behavior of managing and non-managing insiders, from Panels B 
and C of Table 5 we find that, interestingly, non-managing insiders demonstrate trade-based 
abnormal net-purchasing activity in most time periods prior to the litigation announcement. In 
other words, they increase their holdings before the bad news arrives and thus suffer higher 
losses. This finding is in line with Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2008) who provide evidence of 
intense buying following stock price declines. As we observed in our earlier analysis of the 
wealth effects of litigation announcements, the stock prices of sued firms tend to be on a free fall 
long before the announcement. Kaniel, Saar, and Titman’s (2008) findings can also explain the 
significant net-purchasing activity by both managing and non-managing insiders in the year 
following the litigation announcement. Managers, however, exhibit positive abnormal net-selling 
activity prior to the announcement. Overall, these results suggest the presence of informed 
trading by managing insiders in sued firms prior to the litigation announcement. Moreover, it 
indicates that non-managing insiders do not anticipate lawsuits while managers do. This is in line 
with our hypothesis that managers possess superior information regarding potential litigation 
relative to non-managing insiders. To further investigate information asymmetries between our 
two sub-samples, we estimate the mean differences in both measures of abnormal trading and 
test for the equality of means between the abnormal trading of managing and non-managing 
insiders in sued firms. The results are reported in Table 6. On a trade basis, managing and non-
managing insiders differ considerably in their trading activities prior to litigation announcements 
(complementing our earlier findings), although the differences are not statistically significant for 
some periods. We do not find any noteworthy differences in the volume-based measure, although 
                                                          




managers sell considerably fewer shares compared to non-managing insiders seven quarters prior 
to the announcement. 
***Insert Table 6 about here*** 
5.3.3 Drivers of Abnormal Trades 
In our prior discussions, we focused on the net transactions of insiders. In this section, we 
investigate the determinants of these transactions. In what follows, we focus on our trade-based 
measure of abnormal trading. Table 7 provides detailed insights into the drivers of abnormal net 
selling prior to and after litigation announcement, by both managing and non-managing insiders. 
Panel A reports average abnormal sale and purchase transactions using both trade and volume-
based measures. Panel B and C report average abnormal sale and purchase transactions for 
managing and non-managing insiders, respectively. 
***Insert Table 7 about here*** 
From Table 7, Panel A, we observe that the abnormal net selling by all insiders is a result of 
abnormal selling activity, not abnormally lower purchasing activity. In fact, abnormal sales are 
economically and statistically significant in all but the last quarter prior to the litigation 
announcement. Moreover, abnormal sales exhibit a pattern that is similar to the trend in 
abnormal net sales during all quarters and have the same peak period as abnormal net sales. 
Panel B shows a similar trading pattern by managing insiders while non-managing insiders 
display abnormal non-selling behaviour (selling less frequently than during the estimation 
period) prior to the announcement. After the announcement, both managing and non-managing 
insiders exhibit economically and statistically significant negative abnormal selling behavior.  
These findings suggest that, on an aggregate basis, managers engage in active trading and reduce 
their stock holdings prior to litigation announcements. Moreover, they support our hypothesis of 
information asymmetries between managing and non-managing insiders. The negative abnormal 
selling following the announcement is to some extent in line with Kaniel, Saar, and Titman 
(2008). However, they suggest that investors increase their purchases following stock price 
declines while our findings suggest that insiders sell fewer shares. 
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5.3.4 Control Sample 
Table 8 reports average abnormal net selling activity, based on both the trade and volume 
measure, for our control sample. For each firm in the control sample, we employ the same 
lawsuit announcement date as the corresponding firm in our litigation sample. In this control 
sample, both measures of abnormal trading are insignificant. In unreported results, we further 
assess abnormal sales and purchases based on both trade and volume. We find that both 
abnormal sales and abnormal purchases are not significantly different from zero. 
***Insert Table 8 about here*** 
In Table 9, we report mean differences in abnormal net sales and perform a series of tests for the 
equality of mean abnormal net-selling between the litigation and control sample. We observe that 
prior to litigation announcements, the insiders of sued firms exhibit large abnormal net-selling 
(in terms of trades) compared to insiders in our control sample. The differences are statistically 
significant in all periods prior to the announcement. We observe a similar trend for our volume 
measure, although the median test is not significant. After the announcement, any differences in 
abnormal net-selling between the two samples approaches zero. These results provide additional 
evidence supporting our earlier observation of abnormal selling activity by insiders prior to 
litigation announcements.  
***Insert Table 9 about here*** 
5.3.5 Proposed Sales 
Table 10 reports information on the average abnormal proposed sales, both in terms of trades and 
volume, during a period of eight quarters before and after a lawsuit announcement. For brevity 
and because we do not observe any significant abnormal activity for managing and non-
managing insiders, we only report results for all insiders. 
***Insert Table 10 about here*** 
Table 10 suggests a pattern of positive abnormal proposed selling by all insiders prior to 
litigation announcements and negative proposed selling afterwards. On a trade basis, this pattern 
is statistically significant for most periods based on both a parametric and non-parametric test, 
although it is relatively small in terms of magnitude. We also observe an increase in volume-
based abnormal proposed selling during a period from four to two quarters prior to the 
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announcement, however it is not statistically significant. This finding suggests that proposed 
sales by insiders represent another useful tool for investigating the information content and the 
presence of informed trading by insiders. It also complements our earlier observation of 
abnormal insider selling prior to litigation announcements. In unreported analyses we also 
calculated the mean differences between the proposed selling activity by managing and non-
managing insiders. We found no significant differences between the two groups. 
Table 11 reports information on abnormal proposed selling for firms in our control sample. We 
observe that both our trade and volume-based measures are not significantly different from zero, 
either in terms of magnitude or statistical significance.  
***Insert Table 11 about here*** 
Table 12 provides information on the differences in means between abnormal proposed selling 
activity in our litigation sample and our matched control sample. Our trade-based measure 
suggests that insiders of firms in our litigation sample have higher abnormal proposed sales than 
those in our matched control sample until one quarter prior to the litigation announcement. From 
one quarter prior to the announcement and afterwards, the abnormal proposed selling in the sued 
sample is lower than in the control sample. In most periods, the differences in the mean volume-
based measures are small for most periods in terms of magnitude. However, three quarters prior 
to the announcement, the difference is a remarkable nine percent of shares outstanding, followed 
by 1.2 percent in the next quarter. Nevertheless, the mean differences in the volume-based 
measure are not statistically significant for any period before or after the litigation announcement 
according to the parametric test. 
***Insert Table 12 about here*** 
Overall, our analysis of proposed selling activities by insiders in sued firms provides additional 
evidence supporting our hypothesis of abnormal trading activity prior to litigation 
announcements. While these findings are less significant than those for actual trades, the 




5.4 Insider Trading Around Settlement Announcements 
We examine average quarterly abnormal net-sales around settlement announcements over the 16 
quarter period surrounding the settlement announcements. For brevity we only report the results 
for managers, since it is the only sub-sample of insiders with significant insider trading activity 
prior to the settlement announcement. Table 13 reports information on the abnormal net-selling 
activities of managers around settlement announcements. Managers demonstrate excessive 
amounts of transaction-based negative abnormal net-selling activity prior to settlement 
announcements which is statistically significant. However, none of the insider groups exhibit any 
significant volume-based abnormal activity. All insiders and the subgroup of non-managing 
insiders show a similar pattern in terms of the trade-based measure, with no statistical 
significance and considerably lower magnitude, compared to managers. This suggests the 
presence of informed trading by managers of settling firms prior to the announcement, since 
negative net-selling means that they increase their shareholdings prior to the settlement 
announcement and benefit from the consequent stock price appreciation, although these trading 
activities are of a passive nature (non-selling rather than buying). In addition, we examine 
whether there is any abnormal insider trading activity around settlement announcements23 in our 
control sample. We use identical methodology and time periods as for our settlement sample. We 
do not find any significant abnormal trading activity for any of the periods in our control sample. 
This complements our hypothesis of informed trading prior to settlement announcements.  
The difference in the magnitude of abnormal trading activity between managing and non-
managing insiders suggests information asymmetries between these two groups. Either managers 
are better informed than non-managing insiders about the upcoming settlement, or they trade on 
this information more frequently than non-managing insiders. When we evaluated the abnormal 
sale and purchase activities of insiders in unreported analysis we observe that this pattern of 
negative abnormal net selling is a consequence of abnormal non-selling rather than abnormal 
purchasing for all groups of insiders. Our finding is similar to Agrawal and Nasser’s (2012) 
results of informed insider trading behaviour prior to takeover announcements. They also 
observe abnormal non-selling activity prior to takeover announcements. In addition we observe a 
significant pattern of negative abnormal net-selling and non-selling following settlement 
                                                          
23 The date of the settlement announcement of each firm in the settlement sample is day 0 for the matched 
counterpart in the control sample. 
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announcements. This pattern might be partially due to optimism derived from settling legal 
disputes or other overlapping events since it continues for eight quarters following the 
announcement. 
***Insert Table 13 about here*** 
Table 14 reports the mean differences and tests for the equality of means between the net-selling 
activities of managing and non-managing insiders in each quarter. We observe that managing 
insiders exhibit lower abnormal transaction-based net-selling compared to non-managing 
insiders during most quarters prior to and after the announcement. The pattern is similar for the 
volume-based measure. It must be noted that this difference is not statistically significant for any 
of the time periods except four quarters prior to the announcement which is also the peak 
difference in terms of magnitude. This result implies that managers accumulate more shares prior 
to the settlement announcement then non-managing insiders and thus experience greater wealth 
gains following the settlement announcement. These findings provide additional evidence for our 
hypothesis that managers have an information advantage over non-managing insiders. Hence 
they decrease their net-selling prior to settlement announcements in order to benefit from the 
post-settlement stock price run-up. This finding is in line with previous studies such as Ravina 
and Sapienza (2010). They suggest that executives earn higher returns following their purchases 
than independent directors. Executives fall into our managing sub-sample while most 
independent directors fall into our non-managing sub-sample. 
***Insert Table 14 about here*** 
In unreported tests, we also investigated proposed trades of insiders in settling firms and the 
matched control firms. We observe negative and statistically significant abnormal proposed 
selling prior to settlement announcements. This trend is significant for both measures during the 
four quarters prior to the announcement for all insiders. For managers, it is significant during all 
time periods. When we estimate abnormal trading for the control sample and test for differences 
in means, we find abnormal proposed non-selling only for the trade-based measure, which is 
significant during the three quarters prior to the settlement announcement. This finding provides 
additional evidence supporting the existence of informed trading prior to settlement 
announcements. Moreover, it suggests that proposed sales as reported on Form 144 may be a 
useful source of information for regulators who aim to detect illegal insider trading patterns. We 
 26 
 
also analyse differences in the proposed sales of managing and non-managing insiders. Similar to 
our findings for actual trades, we observe that managers tend to have fewer abnormal proposed 
sales compared to non-managing insiders prior to settlement announcements, further 
complementing our earlier observation of an information advantage of managers over non-
managing insiders. 
6. Conclusions 
In this study, we establish that litigation (settlement) announcements are bad (good) news and 
have significant wealth effects for investors. We examine whether corporate insiders possess an 
information advantage over uninformed investors by investigating the presence of informed 
insider trading prior to litigation and settlement announcements. In addition, we examine 
whether there are any information asymmetries between managing and non-managing insiders 
that are reflected in their trading behaviour. We examine insider trades as reported to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission on Form 3, 4, and 5. We find strong evidence of active 
selling and passive non-selling prior to litigation and settlement announcements, respectively. 
Moreover, we contribute to the literature by evaluating proposed sales as reported on SEC Form 
144. This adds additional insights, particularly because none of the previous studies on insider 
trading have investigated proposed sales. Our findings for proposed trades are similar to those 
for actual trades. Our results should be of interest for regulatory bodies investigating illegal 
insider trading activities, since they suggest that Form 144 may be a useful source for detecting 
those activities. We also observe that managers increase (reduce) their selling activities prior to 
litigation (settlement) announcements. This finding provides evidence of information 
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Figure 1: Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) around the Litigation Announcement 
We calculate daily average abnormal returns (AAR) within a period of 250 trading days (about 360 calendar days) 







Figure 2: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) around the Litigation Announcement 
We calculate cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR) within a period of 250 trading days (about 360 calendar 








Figure 3: Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) around the Settlement Announcement 
We calculate daily average abnormal returns (AAR) within a period of 250 trading days (about 360 calendar days) 







Figure 4: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) around the Settlement Announcement 
We calculate cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR) within a period of 250 trading days (about 360 calendar 





Table 1: Litigation Sample Description 
This table provides summary statistics for our sample of 2,153 securities class action lawsuits and 315 settlements 
filed between January 1996 and December 2013. The table employs the industry group classification defined by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Panel A reports the number of securities class action lawsuits in 
different industry groups by year. Panel B reports the number of securities class action settlement across different 
industry groups by year. All settlement amounts have been converted to 1996 dollars based on annual CPI inflation 
rates published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). There are no lawsuits in the industry groups: Agriculture, 
Forestry & Fishing, and Public Administration. In addition, there are no settlements in industry group: non-
classifiable establishments. 
 













1996 5 0 21 1 4 3 3 10 0 47 
1997 8 0 34 5 6 2 3 34 0 92 
1998 19 0 57 3 6 8 8 49 0 150 
1999 15 0 48 0 4 7 10 52 0 136 
2000 13 0 41 1 15 3 3 44 0 120 
2001 10 0 44 2 16 6 3 31 0 112 
2002 23 0 47 6 28 7 6 38 0 155 
2003 35 1 56 3 8 2 11 36 0 152 
2004 28 4 57 2 12 4 7 48 0 162 
2005 20 0 68 5 6 5 8 25 0 137 
2006 12 2 42 1 2 4 6 15 0 84 
2007 32 4 41 0 7 2 5 19 0 110 
2008 52 2 41 5 8 0 3 18 0 129 
2009 23 0 31 2 7 3 3 18 0 87 
2010 21 0 52 9 5 1 1 24 1 114 
2011 12 1 53 10 12 3 9 29 5 134 
2012 12 0 41 14 5 3 7 18 9 109 
2013 14 1 49 9 8 0 8 23 11 123 

















Wholesale Retail Services Total Average 
Settlement 
($million) 
1996 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 18.00 
1997 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 10.10 
1998 0 0 5 0 0 1 1 5 12 7.15 
1999 2 0 8 0 1 1 0 4 16 187.01 
2000 1 0 11 0 0 0 1 10 23 37.76 
2001 3 0 7 1 1 1 0 5 18 18.93 
2002 0 0 11 0 0 0 1 4 16 28.63 
2003 0 0 8 1 3 2 0 7 21 40.81 
2004 5 0 10 0 2 0 1 3 21 21.75 
2005 3 0 11 1 8 1 2 5 31 129.53 
2006 3 1 10 1 6 0 0 9 30 108.398 
2007 4 0 16 0 0 2 0 7 29 108.46 
2008 3 0 14 0 0 2 0 5 24 23.73 
2009 1 1 9 1 0 1 0 2 15 48.26 
2010 2 0 9 1 1 0 1 3 17 35.52 
2011 3 0 5 1 2 0 1 3 15 17.81 
2012 3 0 4 0 1 0 0 1 9 276.07 
2013 1 0 9 0 0 1 0 3 14 13.41 




















Table 2: Insider Trading Sample Description 
This table presents yearly summary statistics on insider trading activities for our sample of 2,153 sued firms from 
January 1996 to December 2013. We collect insider trading data from the Insider Filing Data Feed (IFDF) provided 
by Thomson Reuters. We delete all duplicate, amended and inconsistent transactions as well as option exercises. We 
merge the insider trading dataset with the litigation dataset for the period between 20 quarters before to 8 quarters 
after the lawsuit filing. We report the number and volume (in millions of shares) of insider sales and purchases, as 
well as number and volume of proposed sales. Panel A provides this information for all insiders, and Panel B reports 
the information for managers, and Panel C reports the information for non-managing insiders. 
 




















1996 42105 4581.71 77593 557.68 4981 1447.749 
1997 46697 2938.19 44323 252.96 9712 1229.065 
1998 46144 2599.66 56515 357.55 8812 40833.21 
1999 49838 3040.88 53345 395.02 85 10.06403 
2000 65402 6198.85 57806 498.11 15 1.411838 
2001 60237 4306.54 47588 344.92 6106 500.2656 
2002 56069 3148.06 62303 316.79 6504 547.8657 
2003 95725 3242.962 48961 279.30 8930 921.791 
2004 108066 3534.82 66592 254.92 9999 740.3132 
2005 114576 3801.03 67200 521.62 9812 953.5089 
2006 131917 3638.59 57441 390.13 10251 1031.045 
2007 186347 3703.72 58992 787.08 10849 965.2239 
2008 117505 6083.19 58022 553.50 6370 641.5333 
2009 49518 3577.64 37690 359.72 6656 770.4123 
2010 46583 3255.34 35474 557.46 7067 628.5104 
2011 51866 3570.45 44573 633.12 7221 499.8941 
2012 48786 2703.99 43482 514.08 8328 628.4119 
2013 47232 8714.81 39607 450.74 9094 898.0999 





























1996 29175 1586.07 55389 1685.75 2336 64.23 
1997 33276 1032.57 29638 793.74 5305 470.11 
1998 33632 856.77 37541 1223.09 4668 191.69 
1999 36796 1243.03 33277 1266.91 42 1.82 
2000 46506 3048.06 37509 2580.32 9 0.61 
2001 40203 1708.36 29792 1217.80 3369 221.60 
2002 38983 982.46 26450 994.04 3512 231.50 
2003 67904 1303.47 29365 1146.73 5004 413.27 
2004 76359 1436.82 37378 919.46 6164 490.25 
2005 82936 1568.42 36528 1246.75 6253 680.44 
2006 100702 1224.38 34835 1167.66 6134 393.00 
2007 141007 1094.01 32167 1676.05 6719 398.65 
2008 91741 774.59 28296 983.40 3871 243.20 
2009 36213 731.59 20177 973.99 3754 281.64 
2010 34360 1019.61 20661 1089.88 3855 352.86 
2011 41450 1087.94 26215 1014.98 4307 250.05 
2012 38529 932.87 26111 3084.02 5103 326.49 
2013 37911 1085.23 24952 984.50 5572 326.55 


































1996 12930 2995.63 22204 3891.02 2645 1383.52 
1997 13421 1905.62 14685 1735.85 4407 758.96 
1998 12512 1742.89 18974 2352.36 4144 40641.52 
1999 13042 1797.85 20068 2683.24 43 8.24 
2000 18896 3150.79 20297 2400.81 6 0.80 
2001 20034 2598.17 17796 2231.45 2737 278.66 
2002 17086 2165.60 35853 2173.85 2992 316.36 
2003 27821 1939.49 19596 1646.23 3926 508.52 
2004 31707 2098.00 29214 1629.78 3835 250.07 
2005 31640 2232.61 30672 3969.44 3559 273.07 
2006 31215 2414.21 22606 2733.63 4117 638.04 
2007 45340 2609.71 26825 6194.72 4130 566.57 
2008 25764 5308.60 29726 4551.57 2499 398.33 
2009 13305 2846.05 17513 2623.24 2902 488.77 
2010 12223 2235.73 14813 4484.69 3212 275.65 
2011 10416 2482.50 18358 5316.19 2914 249.84 
2012 10257 1771.13 17371 2056.81 3225 301.92 
2013 9321 7629.58 14655 3522.89 3522 571.55 













Table 3: Abnormal Performance of Sued Firms around Lawsuit Announcements 
This table reports the results of an event study over different event windows before and after a lawsuit 
announcement. In Panel A, we report results for various timeframes prior to the announcement. In Panel B, we 
report results for event windows around and after the announcement. Our sample consists of 2,153 lawsuits filed 
between January 1996 and December 2013. 
 

















Number of Firms 
 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around Lawsuit Announcements 
Panel A: CARs Before Lawsuit Announcements 
-250 to -1 -0.5182 <.0001 -0.47077 <.0001 2153 
-125 to -1 -0.4002 <.0001 -0.36401 <.0001 2153 
-60 to -1 -0.2915 <.0001 -0.26051 <.0001 2153 
-20 to -1 -0.1757 <.0001 -0.12171 <.0001 2153 
-10 to -1 -0.1183 <.0001 -0.05494 <.0001 2153 
-5 to -1 -0.0764 <.0001 -0.02689 <.0001 2153 
-3 to -1 -0.0501 <.0001 -0.01608 <.0001 2153 
-2 to -1 -0.0339 <.0001 -0.00773 <.0001 2152 
Panel B: CARs After Lawsuit Announcements 
-1 to 0 -0.0337 <.0001 -0.00916 <.0001 2153 
-1 to 1 -0.0464 <.0001 -0.01573 <.0001 2153 
0 to 1 -0.0271 <.0001 -0.01212 <.0001 2153 
0 to 2 -0.0340 <.0001 -0.01514 <.0001 2153 
0 to 3 -0.0370 <.0001 -0.01708 <.0001 2153 
0 to 5 -0.0400 <.0001 -0.02163 <.0001 2153 
0 to 10 -0.0456 <.0001 -0.02914 <.0001 2153 
0 to 20 -0.0552 <.0001 -0.03135 <.0001 2153 
0 to 60 -0.0893 <.0001 -0.05602 <.0001 2153 
0 to 125 -0.1407 <.0001 -0.08981 <.0001 2153 










Table 4: Abnormal Performance of Sued Firms around Settlement Announcements 
This table reports the results of an event study over different event windows before and after a settlement 
announcement. In Panel A, we report results for various timeframes prior to the announcement. In Panel B, we 
report results for event windows around and after a lawsuit announcement. Our sample consists of 315 settlements 
announced between January 1996 and December 2013. 
 

















Number of Firms 
 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around Settlement Announcements 
Panel A: CARs Before Settlement Announcements 
-250 to -1 0.0204 0.6546 -0.00257 0.8457 315 
-125 to -1 0.0549 0.0688 0.002755 0.3120 312 
-60 to -1 0.0472 0.0285 0.000776 0.3027 312 
-20 to -1 0.0174 0.1345 0.000882 0.3539 312 
-10 to -1 0.0117 0.2054 0.001310 0.5623 312 
-5 to -1 0.0098 0.1534 0.003391 0.4223 312 
-3 to -1 0.0084 0.1962 0.001655 0.8708 312 
-2 to -1 0.0036 0.5457 -0.00478 0.3331 312 
Panel B: CARs After Settlement Announcements 
-1 to 0 0.0209 0.0003 0.020927 0.0009 312 
-1 to 1 0.0198 0.0007 0.006237 0.0019 312 
0 to 1 0.0213 <.0001 0.005080 <.0001 312 
0 to 2 0.0238 0.0012 0.008933 0.0006 312 
0 to 3 0.0209 0.0016 0.010122 0.0020 312 
0 to 5 0.0164 0.0135 0.005148 0.0750 312 
0 to 10 0.0140 0.1049 0.001455 0.4873 312 
0 to 20 0.0094 0.4099 -0.00015 0.6765 312 
0 to 60 0.0341 0.1285 0.012292 0.2297 312 
0 to 125 0.0205 0.5448 -0.03951 0.5531 313 











Table 5: Abnormal Insider Net Sales around Litigation Announcements 
This table reports abnormal insider net selling activity within a period of 16 quarters, starting 8 quarters before and 
ending 8 quarters after the announcement of 2,153 securities class action lawsuits. We calculate abnormal net sales 
during a given quarter as the actual quarterly net sales for each firm minus the expected net sales of that firm. The 
expected insider net sales for each firm are the mean quarterly net sales for that firm during the 3 year period 
beginning 5 years prior to the litigation announcement and ending 2 years prior to the announcement. All reported 
results are sample wide averages (for all 2,153 lawsuits). The results for our volume-based measure are reported in 
basis points. We present results for all insiders in Panel A, managing insiders in Panel B, and non-managing insiders 
in Panel C. 
 




Count T-Test Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
Volume T-Test Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
(-720,-631) 6.29 0.0000 0.0003 21 0.1507 0.0262 
(-630,-541) 5.69 0.0000 0.0000 83 0.0748 0.8326 
(-540,-451) 5.67 0.0001 0.0000 44 0.0403 0.3622 
(-450,-361) 7.20 0.0000 0.0000 61 0.0017 0.0899 
(-360,-271) 9.46 0.0001 0.0000 53 0.0039 0.0047 
(-270,-181) 8.26 0.0258 0.0000 59 0.0010 0.3457 
(-180,-91) 8.52 0.0000 0.0000 34 0.0244 0.5919 
(-90,-1) 5.00 0.0001 0.8230 31 0.0556 0.0010 
(0,90) -1.23 0.1938 0.0000 -36 0.1341 0.0000 
(91,180) -2.34 0.1190 0.0000 -3 0.8335 0.0000 
(181,270) -1.67 0.1960 0.0000 -15 0.3598 0.0000 
(271,360) 1.76 0.3019 0.0000 -3 0.8675 0.0000 
(361,450) 1.90 0.3494 0.0000 -26 0.2837 0.0000 
(451,540) 2.01 0.4161 0.0000 7 0.6528 0.0000 
(541,630) 2.13 0.2411 0.0000 -3 0.8312 0.0000 
(631,720) 2.50 0.1481 0.0000 4 0.7880 0.0000 




Count T-Test Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
Volume T-Test Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
(-720,-631) 2.00 0.0783 0.0912 1 0.8284 0.0000 
(-630,-541) 1.57 0.0865 0.7695 3 0.3062 0.3909 
(-540,-451) 2.72 0.0174 0.8612 8 0.0256 0.0931 
(-450,-361) 2.96 0.0089 0.3071 9 0.0374 0.8522 
(-360,-271) 3.39 0.0105 0.0215 12 0.0028 0.0884 
(-270,-181) 4.55 0.0224 0.2878 15 0.0005 0.2188 
(-180,-91) 3.94 0.0029 0.7978 10 0.0123 0.9141 
(-90,-1) 0.84 0.4462 0.0000 10 0.0159 0.0000 
(0,90) -3.94 0.0000 0.0000 -5 0.0952 0.0000 
(91,180) -3.72 0.0000 0.0000 -5 0.1292 0.0000 
(181,270) -3.39 0.0001 0.0000 -3 0.5979 0.0000 
(271,360) -1.02 0.5097 0.0000 -2 0.4296 0.0000 
(361,450) -0.40 0.8276 0.0000 -4 0.1838 0.0000 
(451,540) -0.53 0.7589 0.0000 -5 0.3167 0.0000 
(541,630) -1.64 0.2011 0.0000 -3 0.3771 0.0000 









Count T-Test Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
Volume T-Test Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
(-720,-631) -0.47 0.4934 0.0002 0 0.9932 0.0000 
(-630,-541) -0.63 0.4562 0.0067 60 0.1985 0.0000 
(-540,-451) -1.80 0.0415 0.0008 16 0.4427 0.0000 
(-450,-361) -0.52 0.5511 0.0182 32 0.0926 0.0000 
(-360,-271) 1.31 0.4482 0.1022 21 0.2484 0.0000 
(-270,-181) -1.04 0.7047 0.0084 24 0.1746 0.0000 
(-180,-91) -0.17 0.8957 0.0844 4 0.7865 0.0000 
(-90,-1) -0.60 0.4989 0.0000 2 0.9079 0.0000 
(0,90) -2.04 0.0187 0.0000 -50 0.0373 0.0000 
(91,180) -3.37 0.0254 0.0000 -17 0.2451 0.0000 
(181,270) -3.04 0.0173 0.0000 -32 0.0426 0.0000 
(271,360) -1.97 0.0401 0.0000 -20 0.2341 0.0000 
(361,450) -2.45 0.0256 0.0000 -41 0.0871 0.0000 
(451,540) -2.22 0.1540 0.0000 -8 0.5983 0.0000 
(541,630) -0.98 0.4582 0.0000 -19 0.2027 0.0000 

















Table 6: Differences in mean Abnormal Net Sales between Managing and Non-Managing insiders around 
Litigation Announcements 
This table reports differences between mean abnormal net sales by managing and non-managing insiders during a 
period of 16 quarters, starting 8 quarters before and ending 8 quarters after the announcement of 2,153 securities 
class action lawsuits. We calculate mean differences in abnormal net sales as the mean abnormal net sales by 
managers during a given period minus the mean abnormal net sales by non-managing insiders during the same 
period. The results for our volume-based measure are reported in basis points. 




Count T-Test Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
Volume T-Test Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
(-720,-631) 2.4719 0.0626 0.6145 1 0.9688 0.0051 
(-630,-541) 2.1937 0.0774 0.1287 -56 0.2246 <.0001 
(-540,-451) 4.5225 0.0018 0.0666 -9 0.6824 <.0001 
(-450,-361) 3.4779 0.0147 0.0595 -22 0.2466 <.0001 
(-360,-271) 2.0785 0.3407 0.0210 -9 0.6198 <.0001 
(-270,-181) 5.5889 0.0996 0.0333 -9 0.6197 <.0001 
(-180,-91) 4.1114 0.0278 0.5606 6 0.7055 <.0001 
(-90,-1) 1.4440 0.3089 0.1739 8 0.6393 0.0053 
(0,90) -1.8941 0.1128 0.0003 44 0.0655 0.1202 
(91,180) -0.3451 0.8395 0.0042 12 0.4350 0.0293 
(181,270) -0.3535 0.8179 0.0013 29 0.0821 0.0824 
(271,360) 0.9526 0.6015 0.0005 17 0.3048 0.1175 
(361,450) 2.0427 0.3422 0.0030 37 0.1260 0.0675 
(451,540) 1.6920 0.4654 <.0001 3 0.8256 0.4450 
(541,630) -0.6549 0.7226 <.0001 16 0.3076 0.8334 














Table 7: Abnormal Insider Sales/Purchases around Litigation Announcements 
This table reports abnormal insider selling (purchasing) activity within a period of 16 quarters, starting 8 quarters 
before and ending 8 quarters after the announcement of 2,153 securities class action lawsuits. We calculate 
abnormal sales (purchases) during a given quarter as the actual quarterly sales (purchases) of each firm minus the 
expected sales (purchases) of that firm. The expected insider sales (purchases) for each firm are the mean quarterly 
sales (purchases) of that firm during the 3 year period beginning 5 years prior to the litigation announcement and 
ending 2 years prior to the announcement. All reported results are sample wide averages (for all 2,153 lawsuits). The 
results for our volume-based measure are reported in basis points. We present results for all insiders in Panel A, 
managing insiders in Panel B, and non-managing insiders in Panel C. 
Panel A. All Insiders 



















(-720,-631) 6.40 0.0000 0.1673 3 0.5821 0.0000 0.11 0.6294 0.0000 -17 0.1879 0.0000 
(-630,-541) 5.89 0.0000 0.0017 66 0.1349 0.0000 0.19 0.5839 0.0000 -16 0.2222 0.0000 
(-540,-451) 6.99 0.0000 0.0016 34 0.0345 0.0000 1.31 0.0748 0.0000 -10 0.4842 0.0000 
(-450,-361) 8.60 0.0000 0.0000 48 0.0006 0.1643 1.40 0.0534 0.0000 -13 0.3465 0.0000 
(-360,-271) 10.08 0.0000 0.0000 41 0.0009 0.5951 0.62 0.3085 0.0000 -12 0.3753 0.0000 
(-270,-181) 11.15 0.0001 0.0000 50 0.0000 0.0499 2.89 0.2152 0.0000 -9 0.5086 0.0000 
(-180,-91) 9.69 0.0000 0.0001 22 0.0030 0.0411 1.17 0.2705 0.0000 -12 0.3708 0.0000 
(-90,-1) 4.99 0.0000 0.2509 29 0.0008 0.0000 0.00 0.9964 0.0001 -2 0.8776 0.0000 
(0,90) -0.87 0.2830 0.0000 -4 0.6147 0.0000 0.36 0.4643 0.0000 32 0.1601 0.0000 
(91,180) -0.81 0.2896 0.0000 -5 0.3612 0.0000 1.52 0.2602 0.0000 -2 0.8960 0.0000 
(181,270) -1.22 0.1524 0.0000 -10 0.0563 0.0000 0.46 0.6438 0.0000 5 0.7615 0.0000 
(271,360) 1.89 0.2294 0.0000 -8 0.3449 0.0000 0.13 0.8383 0.0000 -5 0.6987 0.0000 
(361,450) 2.17 0.2437 0.0000 2 0.8336 0.0000 0.27 0.7505 0.0000 28 0.2008 0.0000 
(451,540) 2.42 0.2638 0.0000 -1 0.9099 0.0000 0.41 0.7341 0.0000 -8 0.5570 0.0000 
(541,630) 2.18 0.2156 0.0000 -9 0.1049 0.0000 0.05 0.9324 0.0000 -5 0.7019 0.0000 
(631,720) 1.82 0.2788 0.0000 -10 0.1369 0.0000 -0.68 0.1086 0.0000 -14 0.2994 0.0000 
Panel B. Managing insiders 



















(-720,-631) 1.69 0.1356 0.0000 -7 0.0029 0.0000 -0.32 0.0107 0.0000 -8 0.0004 0.0000 
(-630,-541) 1.05 0.2481 0.0004 -5 0.0427 0.0000 -0.52 0.0000 0.0000 -8 0.0005 0.0000 
(-540,-451) 2.20 0.0531 0.0004 -1 0.8433 0.0000 -0.52 0.0000 0.0000 -8 0.0003 0.0000 
(-450,-361) 2.72 0.0153 0.1016 4 0.3103 0.0017 -0.24 0.0960 0.0000 -6 0.0351 0.0000 
(-360,-271) 3.05 0.0210 0.8691 4 0.2059 0.0538 -0.34 0.0010 0.0000 -8 0.0008 0.0000 
(-270,-181) 4.44 0.0255 0.2086 7 0.0457 0.0315 -0.11 0.5103 0.0000 -8 0.0007 0.0000 
(-180,-91) 3.60 0.0062 0.0134 3 0.3753 0.0014 -0.34 0.0025 0.0000 -7 0.0021 0.0000 
(-90,-1) 0.56 0.6093 0.0000 3 0.3233 0.0000 -0.28 0.0088 0.0000 -6 0.0063 0.0000 
(0,90) -4.17 0.0000 0.0000 -11 0.0000 0.0000 -0.24 0.0441 0.0000 -6 0.0080 0.0000 
(91,180) -4.09 0.0000 0.0000 -11 0.0000 0.0000 -0.37 0.0019 0.0000 -6 0.0358 0.0000 
(181,270) -3.93 0.0000 0.0000 -6 0.1339 0.0000 -0.53 0.0000 0.0000 -3 0.4689 0.0000 
(271,360) -1.60 0.3001 0.0000 -10 0.0000 0.0000 -0.58 0.0000 0.0000 -8 0.0004 0.0000 
(361,450) -1.02 0.5818 0.0000 -12 0.0000 0.0000 -0.61 0.0000 0.0000 -8 0.0008 0.0000 
(451,540) -1.16 0.4984 0.0000 -8 0.0163 0.0000 -0.63 0.0000 0.0000 -3 0.3656 0.0000 
(541,630) -2.16 0.0890 0.0000 -10 0.0005 0.0000 -0.52 0.0018 0.0000 -7 0.0147 0.0000 








Panel C. Non-Managing Insiders 



















(-720,-631) -1.78 0.0033 0.0000 -20 0.0025 0.0000 -1.31 0.0000 0.0000 -20 0.1202 0.0000 
(-630,-541) -1.65 0.0358 0.0000 40 0.3651 0.0000 -1.02 0.0003 0.0000 -19 0.1422 0.0000 
(-540,-451) -1.71 0.0096 0.0000 4 0.8260 0.0000 0.10 0.8755 0.0000 -13 0.3612 0.0000 
(-450,-361) -0.61 0.3474 0.0000 14 0.3151 0.0000 -0.10 0.8720 0.0000 -18 0.1696 0.0000 
(-360,-271) 0.54 0.7294 0.0000 6 0.6490 0.0000 -0.77 0.2926 0.0000 -16 0.2553 0.0000 
(-270,-181) 0.22 0.8742 0.0000 12 0.3151 0.0000 1.27 0.5903 0.0000 -12 0.3598 0.0000 
(-180,-91) -0.40 0.5552 0.0000 -12 0.1200 0.0000 -0.23 0.8414 0.0000 -16 0.2297 0.0000 
(-90,-1) -2.06 0.0026 0.0000 -5 0.5465 0.0000 -1.46 0.0122 0.0000 -7 0.6202 0.0000 
(0,90) -3.19 0.0000 0.0000 -23 0.0032 0.0000 -1.14 0.0719 0.0000 27 0.2361 0.0000 
(91,180) -3.21 0.0000 0.0000 -25 0.0001 0.0000 0.16 0.9096 0.0000 -7 0.5952 0.0000 
(181,270) -3.78 0.0000 0.0000 -35 0.0000 0.0000 -0.75 0.4846 0.0000 -4 0.8101 0.0000 
(271,360) -2.99 0.0000 0.0000 -28 0.0020 0.0000 -1.02 0.1912 0.0000 -9 0.5423 0.0000 
(361,450) -3.30 0.0000 0.0000 -17 0.1061 0.0000 -0.85 0.3627 0.0000 24 0.2634 0.0000 
(451,540) -2.91 0.0014 0.0000 -24 0.0016 0.0000 -0.69 0.5928 0.0000 -16 0.2314 0.0000 
(541,630) -2.14 0.0521 0.0000 -29 0.0000 0.0000 -1.16 0.1191 0.0000 -10 0.4802 0.0000 



















Table 8: Abnormal Insider Net Sales around Litigation Announcements (Control Sample) 
 This table reports abnormal insider net selling activity within a period of 16 quarters, starting 8 quarters before and 
ending 8 quarters after the announcement of 2,153 securities class action lawsuits for our sample of matched control 
firms. We calculate abnormal net sales during a given quarter as actual quarterly net sales for each firm minus the 
expected net sales of that firm. The expected insider net sales for each firm are the mean quarterly net sales for that 
firm during the 3 year period beginning 5 years prior to the litigation announcement and ending 2 years prior to the 
announcement. All reported results are sample wide averages (for all 2,153 lawsuits). The results for our volume-





Count T-Test Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
Volume T-Test Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
(-720,-631) 0.34 0.2457 0.2976 -5 0.6356 0.0003 
(-630,-541) 0.79 0.1332 0.5288 9 0.4747 0.0058 
(-540,-451) 0.45 0.2578 0.6005 -3 0.6731 0.0178 
(-450,-361) 0.60 0.3810 0.3419 -3 0.2561 0.0000 
(-360,-271) 0.69 0.1828 0.5051 0 0.8778 0.0330 
(-270,-181) 0.02 0.9582 0.3884 5 0.2841 0.0330 
(-180,-91) -0.07 0.7496 0.2529 0 0.9603 0.0001 
(-90,-1) -0.23 0.5509 0.5306 -8 0.1528 0.0046 
(0,90) -0.39 0.2810 0.1673 3 0.7767 0.0014 
(91,180) -0.22 0.2861 0.0357 -1 0.8553 0.0000 
(181,270) 0.15 0.6410 0.0403 -3 0.8006 0.0000 
(271,360) -0.55 0.2940 0.0054 4 0.6611 0.0000 
(361,450) -0.26 0.3047 0.0059 -3 0.2305 0.0001 
(451,540) -0.08 0.7462 0.0149 -11 0.1103 0.0000 
(541,630) -0.18 0.3880 0.0279 14 0.2605 0.0001 













Table 9: Differences in Mean Abnormal Net Sales between Sued and Non-Sued firms around Litigation 
Announcements 
This table reports differences between mean abnormal net sales by insiders of sued firms (i.e. firms in our litigation 
sample) and insiders in non-sued firms (i.e. firms in our matched control sample), within a period of 16 quarters, 
starting 8 quarters before and ending 8 quarters after the announcement of 2,153 securities class action lawsuits in 
our litigation sample and the corresponding 2,153 matched control firms. We calculate mean differences in 
abnormal net sales as mean abnormal net sales by insiders of sued firms minus the mean abnormal net sales by 





Count T-Test Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
Volume T-Test Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
(-720,-631) 5.9472 <.0001 0.0071 25 0.1450 0.1683 
(-630,-541) 4.9017 <.0001 0.0006 73.1 0.1288 0.4611 
(-540,-451) 5.2236 0.0004 0.0018 46.5 0.0374 0.0623 
(-450,-361) 6.5998 <.0001 <.0001 63.7 0.0011 0.2334 
(-360,-271) 8.7749 0.0002 <.0001 53 0.0041 0.1636 
(-270,-181) 8.2394 0.0269 <.0001 54 0.0032 0.3949 
(-180,-91) 8.5868 <.0001 0.0028 33.5 0.0343 0.9632 
(-90,-1) 5.2254 <.0001 0.0084 39.5 0.0225 <.0001 
(0,90) -0.8387 0.4073 <.0001 -38.9 0.1419 <.0001 
(91,180) -2.1169 0.1622 <.0001 -2.3 0.8812 <.0001 
(181,270) -1.8205 0.1717 <.0001 -12.2 0.5259 <.0001 
(271,360) 2.3076 0.1951 <.0001 -6.3 0.7299 <.0001 
(361,450) 2.1674 0.2907 <.0001 -22.4 0.3501 <.0001 
(451,540) 2.0824 0.4010 <.0001 18.3 0.2870 <.0001 
(541,630) 2.3058 0.2074 <.0001 -17.2 0.3756 <.0001 














Table 10: Abnormal Proposed Insider Sales around Litigation Announcements 
 This table reports abnormal proposed sales by insiders during a period of 16 quarters, starting 8 quarters before and 
ending 8 quarters after the announcement of 2,153 securities class action lawsuits in our litigation sample. We 
calculate abnormal proposed sales during a given quarter as the actual quarterly proposed sales for each firm minus 
the expected proposed sales of that firm. The expected proposed insider sales for each firm are the mean quarterly 
proposed sales for that firm during the 3 year period beginning 5 years prior to the litigation announcement and 
ending 2 years prior to the announcement. All reported results are sample wide averages (for all 2,153 lawsuits). The 





Count T-Test Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
Volume T-Test Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
(-720,-631) 0.20 0.0078 0.0000 10 0.3298 0.0000 
(-630,-541) 0.41 0.0000 0.1011 -1 0.7632 0.0000 
(-540,-451) 0.41 0.0000 0.2799 4 0.3736 0.0000 
(-450,-361) 0.78 0.0000 0.0718 4 0.0803 0.0991 
(-360,-271) 0.84 0.0000 0.0151 98 0.2917 0.3009 
(-270,-181) 0.84 0.0000 0.0415 909 0.3172 0.6850 
(-180,-91) 0.88 0.0000 0.0219 111 0.2525 0.6346 
(-90,-1) 0.31 0.0003 0.0006 4 0.1385 0.0000 
(0,90) -0.25 0.0560 0.0000 5 0.4682 0.0000 
(91,180) -0.16 0.0770 0.0000 0 0.9786 0.0000 
(181,270) -0.24 0.0013 0.0000 -4 0.0767 0.0000 
(271,360) -0.28 0.0002 0.0000 -3 0.1639 0.0000 
(361,450) -0.12 0.1409 0.0000 -4 0.0609 0.0000 
(451,540) -0.21 0.0145 0.0000 -5 0.0238 0.0000 
(541,630) -0.23 0.0037 0.0000 -3 0.1898 0.0000 














Table 11: Abnormal Proposed Insider Sales around Litigation Announcements (Control Sample) 
 This table reports insider proposed sales during a period of 16 quarters, starting 8 quarters before and ending 8 
quarters after the announcement of 2,153 securities class action lawsuits for our matched control sample. For each 
control firm, we consider the lawsuit announcement date of the corresponding sued firm. We calculate abnormal 
proposed sales during a given quarter as the actual quarterly proposed sales for each firm minus the expected 
proposed sales of that firm. The expected proposed insider sales for each firm are the mean quarterly proposed sales 
for that firm during the 3 year period beginning 5 years prior to the litigation announcement and ending 2 years prior 
to the announcement. All reported results are sample wide averages (for all 2,153 lawsuits). The results for our 




Count T-Test Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
Volume T-Test Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
(-720,-631) -0.09 0.2208 0.0000 -11 0.2325 0.0000 
(-630,-541) 0.04 0.5396 0.0000 -13 0.1349 0.0000 
(-540,-451) 0.07 0.3227 0.0000 -6 0.5330 0.0000 
(-450,-361) 0.24 0.0009 0.0336 -12 0.1799 0.0000 
(-360,-271) 0.30 0.0000 0.4875 -11 0.2269 0.0000 
(-270,-181) 0.30 0.0001 0.0985 -5 0.5875 0.0000 
(-180,-91) 0.39 0.0000 0.8376 -7 0.4731 0.0023 
(-90,-1) 0.51 0.0000 0.1186 -9 0.2915 0.0065 
(0,90) 0.58 0.0000 0.0123 -4 0.6521 0.5811 
(91,180) 0.46 0.0000 0.2693 0 0.9940 0.0630 
(181,270) 0.47 0.0000 0.3470 -5 0.5527 0.0270 
(271,360) 0.25 0.0005 0.3223 -5 0.6009 0.0000 
(361,450) 0.26 0.0007 0.1647 -2 0.8550 0.0000 
(451,540) 0.12 0.0868 0.0004 -11 0.2232 0.0000 
(541,630) 0.09 0.1991 0.0000 -11 0.1998 0.0000 














Table 12: Differences in Mean Abnormal Proposed Sales between Sued and Non-Sued Firms around 
Litigation Announcements 
This table reports differences between mean abnormal proposed sales by insiders of sued firms (i.e. firms in our 
litigation sample) and insiders in non-sued firms (i.e. firms in our matched control sample), within a period of 16 
quarters, starting 8 quarters before and ending 8 quarters after the announcement of 2,153 securities class action 
lawsuits in our litigation sample and the corresponding 2,153 matched control firms. We calculate mean differences 
in abnormal proposed sales as mean abnormal proposed sales by insiders of sued firms minus the mean abnormal 





Count T-Test Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
Volume T-Test Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
(-720,-631) 0.2859 0.0057 0.5324 19 0.2856 0.9985 
(-630,-541) 0.3676 0.0011 0.8873 12.6 0.1690 0.8353 
(-540,-451) 0.3393 0.0011 0.8474 10.6 0.3470 0.8984 
(-450,-361) 0.5334 <.0001 0.6032 16 0.0810 0.2595 
(-360,-271) 0.5316 <.0001 0.6050 109 0.2441 0.5101 
(-270,-181) 0.5358 <.0001 0.5992 902 0.3169 0.1552 
(-180,-91) 0.4893 0.0004 0.2071 117 0.2275 0.9341 
(-90,-1) -0.2009 0.0877 <.0001 13.1 0.1554 0.0048 
(0,90) -0.8270 <.0001 <.0001 8.62 0.4332 <.0001 
(91,180) -0.6184 <.0001 <.0001 0 0.9999 0.9800 
(181,270) -0.7113 <.0001 <.0001 1.33 0.8868 <.0001 
(271,360) -0.5344 <.0001 <.0001 1.83 0.8555 <.0001 
(361,450) -0.3755 0.0006 <.0001 -2 0.8535 <.0001 
(451,540) -0.3314 0.0029 <.0001 6.18 0.4999 <.0001 
(541,630) -0.3156 0.0026 <.0001 8.31 0.3670 <.0001 














Table 13: Abnormal Insider Net Sales around Settlement Announcements (Managing Insiders) 
This table reports abnormal insider net selling activity within a period of 16 quarters, starting 8 quarters before and 
ending 8 quarters after the announcement of 315 securities class action settlements. We calculate abnormal net sales 
during a given quarter as actual quarterly net sales for each firm minus the expected net sales of that firm. The 
expected insider net sales for each firm are the mean quarterly net sales for that firm during the 3 year period 
beginning 5 years prior to the settlement announcement and ending 2 years prior to the announcement. All reported 
results are sample wide averages (for all 315 settlements). The results for volume-based measure are reported in 





Count T-Test Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
Volume T-Test Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
(-720,-631) -3.48 0.0245 0.0000 2 0.6830 0.0000 
(-630,-541) -2.27 0.3246 0.0000 -5 0.3020 0.0001 
(-540,-451) -4.10 0.0414 0.0000 -11 0.0250 0.0000 
(-450,-361) -4.68 0.0043 0.0000 -2 0.7672 0.0000 
(-360,-271) -6.06 0.0001 0.0000 -9 0.0562 0.0000 
(-270,-181) -4.38 0.0064 0.0000 -5 0.2967 0.0000 
(-180,-91) -3.85 0.0359 0.0000 -10 0.0319 0.0000 
(-90,-1) -4.25 0.0337 0.0000 -11 0.0147 0.0000 
(0,90) 0.51 0.8524 0.0000 -9 0.0038 0.0000 
(91,180) -2.64 0.2496 0.0000 -4 0.5587 0.0000 
(181,270) -5.37 0.0013 0.0000 -20 0.1261 0.0000 
(271,360) -4.73 0.0119 0.0000 -13 0.0243 0.0000 
(361,450) -5.23 0.0022 0.0000 -13 0.0031 0.0000 
(451,540) -3.98 0.0395 0.0000 -19 0.0429 0.0000 
(541,630) -3.43 0.1682 0.0000 -12 0.0076 0.0000 











Table 14: Differences in Mean Abnormal Net Sales between Managing and Non-Managing Insiders around 
Settlement Announcements 
This table reports differences between mean abnormal net sales by managing and non-managing insiders during a 
period of 16 quarters, starting 8 quarters before and ending 8 quarters after the announcement of 315 securities class 
action settlements. We calculate mean differences in abnormal net sales as the mean abnormal net sales by managers 
during a given period minus the mean abnormal net sales by non-managing insiders during the same period. 




Count T-Test Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
Volume T-Test Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
(-720,-631) -1.2441 0.4910 0.3567 -114 0.1815 0.8884 
(-630,-541) 0.9273 0.7179 0.6581 -46.9 0.4715 0.8529 
(-540,-451) -1.5361 0.4998 0.2314 -46.9 0.4696 0.3428 
(-450,-361) -2.4409 0.2494 0.0965 -54 0.4097 0.7066 
(-360,-271) 
-5.3584 0.0092 0.0249 -35.2 0.5899 0.2051 
(-270,-181) -2.1615 0.2449 0.1852 -43.7 0.5035 0.2162 
(-180,-91) -0.9488 0.6489 0.3204 -46.8 0.4709 0.5941 
(-90,-1) -1.9584 0.3899 0.0951 -51.9 0.4331 0.1176 
(0,90) 3.9400 0.1826 0.2068 -41.5 0.5247 0.4054 
(91,180) 0.1464 0.9556 0.1179 -42.3 0.5169 0.2413 
(181,270) -5.3457 0.0257 0.2442 -83.6 0.2094 0.2263 
(271,360) -3.4727 0.1131 0.0728 -62.1 0.3462 0.2148 
(361,450) -3.0695 0.1289 0.1007 -54.7 0.4293 0.2516 
(451,540) -1.0695 0.6388 0.5171 -51.2 0.4404 0.6005 
(541,630) -0.3838 0.8860 0.2084 -47 0.4747 0.5448 





Appendix 1: Excluded Insiders 
We exclude trades by insiders who are less likely to possess material private information and thus their trades are less likely to be 
informed 
Insider Role Code 
Unknown UT 
Beneficial Owner of more than 10% of a Class of Security B 
Beneficial Owner as Custodian BC 
Beneficial Owner as Trustee BT 
















Chief executive officer CEO Vice chairman VC 
Chief financial officer CFO Member of the advisory committee AC 
Chairman of the board CB Member of the compensation committee CC 
Chief investment officer CI Member of the executive committee EC 
Chief operating officer CO Member of the finance committee FC 
Chief technology officer CT Member of committee or advisory board MC 
Officer, director, and beneficial 
owner 
H Member of the science/technology committee SC 
Officer and director OD Affiliated person AF 
Director D Affiliate of investment advisor AI 
Vice president VP General council GC 
Assistant vice president AV Investment advisor IA 
Executive vice president EVP Founder F 
Senior vice president SVP General partner GP 
Officer O Limited partner LP 
Officer and beneficial owner OB Managing partner M 
Officer of parent company OP Managing director MD 
Officer of Subsidiary Company OS Voting trustee VT 
Officer and Treasurer OT   
Divisional Officer OX   
President P   
Secretary S   
Controller C   
Controlling Person CP   
General Manager GM   
Other Executive OE   
Treasurer TR   
 
 
